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Currently the Nepali government and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) are involved in a campaign to increase rates of government registration 
among small businesses, which are technically illegal to operate unregistered.  
The program incentivizes and facilitates registration, attempting to change the 
cost-benefit analysis that shopkeepers make when deciding whether to register.  
Using interviews with small business owners in the Kathmandu area, this study 
provides qualitative data about what information these shopkeepers have, how 
they perceive the registration process, whether the government has traditionally 
followed through on its promises, and how all of these factors affect their 
registration cost-benefit analyses.  Additionally, this study examines the 
perceptions, priorities, and methods of NGOs and government officials involved 
in directing initiatives which affect the informal economy.  From the shopkeeper 
side we find that a confusing registration process as well as distrust in the 
government are the primary barriers to registration.  From the government and 
NGO side we find that lack of information sharing and collaboration between 
various government ministries as well as between NGOs and the government are 
harmful to registration efforts. 
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 As one walks the streets of Kathmandu, small roadside shops are a 
bustling source of commercial activity.  These small shops, generally owned and 
operated by a single individual or family, represent a significant portion of 
Nepal’s overall employment, economic activity, and potential for growth.  The 
only problem with this keystone of Nepali commerce is that many of these small 
shops are operating illegally.  Although the vast majority of small shops do 
honest business selling entirely legal goods and services, many of them have not 
officially been registered with the government.  This lack of government 
documentation makes these shops a part of Nepal’s informal economy, a 
nebulous term which academics have yet to define by consensus.  For the 
purposes of this paper we will use the definition from Ihrig and Moe (2004) to 
define informal enterprises as those which produce legal goods, but do not 
comply with government regulations.  Specifically, this paper will focus on small 
retail or food shops.  Using a broader definition of the informal economy which 
categorizes all unregistered activities, including those illegal by nature, as 
informal, Schneider (2002) estimates that informal activity may account for forty 
percent of Nepal’s GDP.  Other studies testify to the substantial nature of Nepal’s 
informal economy, estimating that it employs more than 96% of Nepal’s 
economically active population (Suwal & Pant, 2009) overall, with 70% of those 
working non-agricultural jobs involved in informal economic activity (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2008). 
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 Currently, the International Labour Organization (ILO) is working with 
the Nepali government towards registering the informal sector though a mixture 
of incentives, informational campaigns, and bureaucratic changes.  The 
programme, entitled “Way Out of Informality: Facilitating Formalization of 
Informal Economy in South Asia,” works closely with Nepal’s District Cottage 
and Small Industries Offices (DCSIO) in an attempt to centralize registration 
procedures and improve benefit distribution structures, which have previously 
been very difficult for shopkeepers to access.  Mr. Shailendra Kumar Jha, the 
National Programme Coordinator for this project, makes it clear that forcing 
shopkeepers to register is not a viable strategy; rather, he says, the government 
and ILO together “must encourage and facilitate registration, highlighting the 
benefits to ensure that businesses choose to register” (Kumar Jha, 2014).  The 
ILO is currently offering such incentives for registering as loans with the ILO’s 
partner – Megabank – and business management trainings.  To better understand 
the cost-benefit analysis that shopkeepers make when deciding to register, my 
research draws upon interviews with individual shopkeepers who have been 
through the registration process, or decided to remain unregistered.  Additionally, 
a series of interviews with government officials and experts in the field helps to 
explain the workings of Nepal’s current policy, as well as what efforts are 
currently in place to aid workers in the informal sector and encourage 
registration.  My research will build upon a strong foundation of informal sector 
literature to provide a qualitative analysis of how political and economic factors 
contribute to the large quantity of illegally operating businesses in Nepal.  
1.2) Informal Sector History 
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Before the term “informal economy” was coined by a 1972 ILO study, 
very little academic work was devoted to understanding economic activity which 
was not registered with or regulated by the government.  Soon afterwards, 
academics began to take the challenges presented by this portion of the economy 
much more seriously.  Hart (1973) uses Ghana as a case study to conduct one of 
the earliest analyses of an informal economy.  He hypothesizes a variety of 
causes for the informal economy, and notes that the emergence of this sector has 
complicated income and consumption patterns significantly.  Thus, one of the 
first revelations about the informal economy was that it disrupted traditional 
western economic theories and prescriptions, thereby making the application of 
western economic and social policy in developing nations potentially disastrous 
(Hart, 1973). 
 Following the ILO and Hart’s pioneering of informal sector research 
came a still unresolved struggle to define the informal economy.  While Hart 
(1973) defined the informal economy as essentially synonymous with self-
employment, ILO (1972) defined Kenya’s informal sector as a space unregulated 
and largely marginalized by the government.  Since then, Hart has broadened his 
definition to include all economic activities that take place outside the framework 
of bureaucratic public and private sector establishments (Hart 2008).  As 
previously discussed, this paper will define informal enterprises as those which 
produce legal goods, but do not comply with government regulations (Ihrig and 
Moe, 2004).  Though some studies explore the informal sector in developed 
nations, largely the literature is focused on how developing or transitional 
countries are effected by their informal economy. Elgin and Oyvat, (2013: 7) note 
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that “the growth of the informal sector was observed all in Asian (Moser, 1978); 
African (Wuyts, 2001); and Latin American (de Janvry, 1981; Furtado, 1976) 
countries in their early phases of development.” 
1.3) Informal Sector Causes 
 As the study of informal economies became more common, many papers 
devoted themselves to understanding what caused these underground economic 
activities.  Ultimately the debate largely breaks down into those researchers who 
attribute the growth of informal economies primarily to market factors, and those 
who attribute this growth primarily to political factors. 
Hart (1973) began the discussion of market factors by positing that price 
inflation, low wages in the formal sector and surplus labor in the urban market 
were the primary causes of informality.  Future studies reinforced the idea that 
labor surpluses and urbanization were among the main determinants of 
informality (Breman, 1980); (Elgin and Oyvat 2013).  This line of thinking 
suggests that the informal sector is a natural offshoot of saturated labor markets 
and weak formal economies.  The belief that market forces were the primary 
reason for informality created a conviction in the early stages of informal sector 
studies that economic growth would pull enterprises into the formal sector. 
Bangasser (2000:4) notes that before longitudinal data existed on the progress of 
informal economies “It was axiomatic that, as ‘take off’ was achieved and the 
development process gained momentum, the ‘modern sector’ would gradually 
absorb them.”  When economic growth in developing countries showed no sign 
of decreasing informality – in some cases even increasing it – scholars began to 
give more thought to the political factors that contributed to informality. 
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In 1989, De Soto’s radical work The Other Path hypothesized that the 
informal economy was a logical and efficient reaction to corruption, inefficient 
government bureaucracy and a formal sector made generally undesirable by 
government constraints.  Following this seminal work, a series of studies 
reinforced that informal economies were in large part encouraged by corruption 
(Dutta et al, 2013), poor government systems (Levy, 2008), government-imposed 
barriers to entering the formal economy (Djankov et. al, 2002) as well as high 
degrees of bureaucratic discretion; low degrees of economic liberalization; high 
tax burdens; lack of credibility towards government; and macroeconomic 
instability (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996).  In one of the most comprehensive 
examinations of informal economies across the world, Schneider (2000:19) 
confidently states “In almost all studies, the increase of the tax and social security 
contribution burdens is one of the main causes for the increase of the shadow 
economy (Thomas, 1992), (Lippert and Walker, 1997), (Schneider, 1994, 1997, 
1998), (Johnson, Kauffman and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998a, 1998b), (De Soto, 1989), 
(Zilberfarb, 1986), (Tanzi, 1999), and (Giles, 1999a).” 
   Only two years after De Soto’s original publication, the ILO readily 
acknowledged that economic growth was not necessarily the cure for a large 
informal economy saying, “Contrary to earlier beliefs, the informal sector is not 
going to disappear spontaneously with economic growth. It is, on the contrary, 
likely to grow in the years to come, and with it the problems of urban poverty and 
congestion will also grow” (ILO, 1991: 63). 
1.4) Informal Sector Consequences  
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Parallel to the debate concerning the many potential causes for informal 
economic activity runs an equally complex debate over a much simpler question: 
are informal economies good or bad?  Though most academics agree that 
integrating informal economies into formal economies would be ideal in a perfect 
political atmosphere, much disagreement surrounds the role of informal 
economies in realistic scenarios.  The essential question in this debate is whether 
informal economies exacerbate the problems of inefficient governments and 
disrupt formal markets, or whether they provide an avenue for productive 
economic activity despite the corruption and disorganized bureaucracy that often 
characterize these governments.  The ILO’s 1972 publication begins the debate 
by suggesting that Kenya’s informal sector is a productive, positive development 
that suffers from governmental misunderstanding.  The study hypothesizes that 
treating informal economies as a problem may create a vicious cycle in which 
governments suppress and discourage informal activity until it becomes 
marginalized and inefficient (ILO, 1972).   Bangasser (2000:11) posits that 
despite this initial publication the ILO went on to hold “a pejorative official view 
that perpetuates debilitating conditions and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
low productivity and poverty but (sic) ignores the creative potential and energies 
of the informal sector.” 
 Much literature following the ILO publication either made arguments that 
the informal sector was harmful to the state, or implicitly assumed so.  At the 
macro level, Frey (1989) argues that a large informal sector deprives the state of 
tax income, thereby decreasing the amount of state goods available to both formal 
and informal sector workers.  From the micro perspective, Kauffman and 
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Kaliberda (1996) argue that the informal economy is a “survival sector” in which 
workers are merely trying to maintain subsistence, and often looking for other 
options.  Thus they believe that investments will necessarily be low, and growth 
very slow.  Though findings from Brazil indicate that most self-employed 
workers in the informal economy prefer to remain in this situation rather than 
participate in the formal economy (Maloney, 2004), the concept that informal 
employment is undesirable to its participants remains widespread.  Under the 
implicit assumption that the informal economy cannot provide sustained growth 
for a country or productive employment for its laborers, some argue that the 
informal economy is destructive because it stifles growth which would otherwise 
be occurring in the formal sector (Portes, Castells, and Benton, 1989); (Gaddy 
and Ickes, 1998). 
 Following years of general disregard for the ILO’s 1972 claim that the 
informal economy could offer a legitimate alternative to formal employment, De 
Soto (1989) provides the most substantial argument reiterating the productive 
potential of informal economies.  Having stated that informal economies are 
largely caused by corruption and inefficient bureaucracy, De Soto goes on to 
posit that the informal sector is a necessary escape from governments which stifle 
economic growth.  Ultimately De Soto advises that states make no effort to 
register the informal sector until they are capable of providing a productive 
business environment for all enterprises.  ILO (1972), which was the first paper 
to view the informal economy in a positive light, recommended that the 
government respect the efficiency of the informal economy, but channel its 
productive potential into the formal economy by reforming outdated and 
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unnecessary licensing procedures.  Similarly, Harding and Jenkins (1989) argue 
that if informal economic activities are supported they can become a strong 
source of economic growth for states.  Levy (2008) posits that government 
inefficiencies contribute to the informal sector, and recommends that 
governments use incentive structures, as the ILO is doing, to formalize the 
informal sector.  Essentially, this vein of the literature emphasizes the linkages 
between informal and formal enterprises, suggesting that the government allow 
businesses to grow informally without penalty or marginalization, but encourage 
them to enter the formal economy through reforming bureaucratic processes and 
offering incentives. 
 Though various theoretical and macro-level data exists debating the 
causes and consequences of the informal economy, very little examines how 
policy writers and shopkeepers perceive informality. Schneider (2000: 17) 
concludes a thorough macroeconomic survey of informal economies around the 
world by noting: 
“Because macroeconomic approaches can often only 
show statistical correlation rather than causal relations, 
they cannot provide answers to questions like: Why do 
people choose to work in the shadow economy? What 
other factors (besides income motive) cause an increase 
in formal activities?... Because only individuals can 
choose, according to methodological individualism, it 




1.5) The Individual Decision Process 
While much scholarship exists surrounding the informal economy, only 
recently have empirical studies begun to appear which more deeply investigate 
the process of registering informal enterprises.  Woodruff (2013) uses a 
controlled study to measure the effectiveness of information and incentives in 
attempts to register informal businesses in Sri Lanka.  The study finds that 
simply informing shopkeepers about the benefits of registering yields no results, 
while providing cash incentives along with this information can increase 
probability of registration by nearly fifty percent (Woodruff 2013).  Additionally, 
Woodruff’s follow-up finds that some businesses grew exponentially after 
registering, suggesting that they may have been intentionally hampering their 
own growth for fear of drawing government attention and being forced into the 
formal sector (Woodruff 2013).  Though Woodruff’s findings are an excellent 
starting point, his controlled research does not emulate realistic scenarios in 
which incentives consist of government programs rather than cash.  Especially in 
cases like that of Nepal, where my research finds that shopkeepers have difficulty 
obtaining government-promised benefits, it is important to examine existing 
incentive structures as opposed to theoretical ones. 
Cling et al. (2012) perform an analysis of informal sector registration in 
Vietnam which includes some qualitative information about the registration 
decision.  Cling’s analysis shows that poor information is a key determinant in 
the decision to remain unregistered (Cling 2012).  This finding seems to imply 
that improving information should improve registration, a notion which 
Woodruff (2013) found untrue in Sri Lanka.  Cling also finds that for those who 
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did choose to register, government benefits of formalization played a key role in 
their decision.  Among the most important motivators were freedom from 
corruption and the ability to advertise (Cling, 2012).  Thus, Cling makes an 
important contribution by confirming the effectiveness of structural incentives 
such as government benefits and providing a different perspective on the role of 
information.   
These two works provide a solid, largely quantitative basis for research 
on the registration process, but lack an in-depth qualitative analysis of 
shopkeepers’ cost-benefit analyses.  Additionally, the seeming contradictions in 
Woodruff (2013) and Cling (2012) concerning the importance of information 
suggest that country-specific factors likely play a large role in determining the 
effectiveness of various informal economy registration efforts.  My qualitative 
research complements these studies by providing an in-depth investigation into 
the decision making processes of Nepali shopkeepers who are considering 
registration as well as those who have already registered. This study’s 
investigation of shopkeepers’ cost-benefit analyses sheds light on the reasons 
shopkeepers choose to register or remain unregistered, thereby helping to explain 
some of the causes for Nepal’s large informal economy.  The addition of 
interviews with Nepali informal sector experts and government officials 
illuminates how many of the bureaucratic processes discussed actually function.  
I find that because information is disseminated so poorly, there often is a large 
gap between how shopkeepers perceive bureaucratic processes and how the 
government intends them to function. 
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As I speak to small unregistered shop owners about formalizing their 
enterprises, I find that two primary considerations often discourage them from 
registering with the government: the difficulty of the process itself, and their 
distrust of the Nepali government.  Ultimately, it appears that such political 
factors as bureaucratic inefficiency, broken government promises, and 
inappropriate legislation are among the primary factors that contribute to Nepal’s 
large informal sector.  Though the ILO is working to facilitate the registration 
process and centralize distribution of benefits, I find that lack of collaboration 
and information sharing between various government ministries and NGOs is 
hampering the reform process. 
2) Methodology 
To collect data concerning the informal economy in Nepal, I interviewed 
the owners of small shops, government officials, academics, and researchers.  My 
many discussions with small shop owners accounts for the bulk of my interviews, 
as well as the most original and integral component of my research.  I defined 
small shops for this research as those which are primarily owned and operated by 
an individual, family, or partnership, and do not employ laborers who are paid 
regular wages.  
As I asked owners of small shops in each of my interviews whether their 
shop was registered or not (it would be illegal for them not to register) the most 
important aspect of my research was ensuring the safety of these shopkeepers.  
Almost all of these interviews were conducted in Nepali, as few shopkeepers 
spoke fluent English.  In some interviews a relative of the shopkeeper who spoke 
good English would serve as a translation aid.  To initiate an interview I would 
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introduce myself to a shopkeeper, explain that I was a student conducting 
research about small Nepali shops and the registration process, and show them a 
letter written in Nepali script which explained that I was completing an 
independent research project. After explaining the goals of my research and my 
reasons for doing it, I would ask them if they were willing to talk to me about 
their own shop, and its registration status.  If they agreed I would go on to 
produce an informed consent form, which I would verbally explain in Nepali if 
they could not read English.  After explaining that they could abstain from 
answering any questions, or withdraw from the interview at any time, I 
proceeded to give them an English pseudonym for protection, unless they 
specifically requested that their real name be used.  To mark the interview, I 
wrote down only their pseudonym (or name, if requested), the town in which 
their shop was located, and the date and time.  In cases where the type of shop 
was a very common one (cold stores, clothing shops, etc.) I would note the kind 
of shop; however, if the shop was unique enough to be identified by mentioning 
its wares, I would refrain from writing down this information.  At the end of the 
interview I asked if the shopkeeper had any questions, and ensured that they felt 
comfortable with all of the information they had volunteered being used in my 
research.  Because interview transcripts contain only a pseudonym and a very 
broad locational description, with any potentially identifying information 
omitted, I felt that this was appropriate protection for my interviewees. 
At the start of my project I intended to interview shop keepers at random 
in various areas and neighborhoods, however I quickly found that this was an 
inefficient way of conducting my research.  My primary problem was that most 
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shop owners were not willing to participate in an interview during business hours 
when customers could potentially need to be helped.  Most shop owners were 
also unwilling to interview after the business day was over.  Additionally, I found 
that even those who did have free time during the business day were sometimes 
very wary of my research and did not wish to participate in an interview for fear 
they would get in trouble.  To solve these problems I ended up conducting many 
of my interviews through introductions to various shop owners.  Shop owners 
tended to be much more willing to speak to me if a friend of theirs introduced 
me, explained my research, and vouched for me.  Thus, many of my interviews 
were conducted through friends, friends of friends, and other distant contacts.  
This method of finding interviewees, coupled with the fact that some people 
refused to participate in interviews or withdrew from the interview, creates a very 
serious selection bias in my research.  Because of this, it is important that my 
research be understood as a discussion of various perspectives on Nepal’s 
informal economy and registration process, as opposed to a representative sample 
of shopkeeper’s beliefs.  Though a survey would have been helpful in achieving 
a more well-rounded consensus on certain issues, it was essentially impossible to 
administer given people’s general unwillingness to answer questions concerning 
their shop’s legal status without a proper introduction from a friend. 
Interviews with government officials, academics and researchers were 
ethically simpler because I did not ask whether these people engaged in illegal 
activities.  All of these interviews were conducted primarily in English.  
However, some government and NGO officials required permission from their 
superiors to sign a consent form, which was not always granted.  They would 
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occasionally speak off the record, giving me general information about the 
informal economy and future leads, but requesting it not be credited to them or 
their organization.  After interviews in which this was the case I would prepare a 
document with all the information I wished to attribute to the interviewee and 
allow them to redact or correct pieces of the information.  After this process I was 
permitted to use the relevant information in my research. 
3) Registration: A Confusing and Unrewarding Process 
3.1) Time Constraints, Incentives, and Disincentives 
 The World Bank’s Doing Business 2010 publication estimates that 
registering a business in Nepal requires seven distinct procedures and 31 days of 
the business owner’s time, suggesting that Nepal’s cumbersome registration 
process may be a main contributor to the size of the informal economy.  The 
World Bank collects this data by using a case study of what they consider to be a 
“typical” company, which is of average size. I find that 15 days emerges as a 
consensus for the amount of days it takes to register a very small business, 
though 6-7 processes remains a relatively accurate estimate.  Many registered 
participants in my research specifically remember a 15 day process, while some 
participants who had not registered independently produced the number as one 
they had heard through friends.  Almost all unregistered participants in my 
research at some point cited the arduous process as one of their reasons for not 
registering.  One woman, who asked to be identified only as Kamala, said plainly 
that if the process were made easier she would surely register (Kamala, 2014).  
Additionally, participants cited vastly different estimates of how much the entire 
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process cost them, or how much they expected to pay.  One participant expressed 
confidence that the fees would amount to approximately 10,000 rupees (Austin, 
2014) while another estimated 1,000 (John, 2014).  Of those who had been 
through the process Kamal recalled 17,000 rupees in fees, while Kumar noted a 
6,000 rupee a year cost to remain registered.  The complete lack of consensus 
regarding registration fees suggests not only a lack of information about the 
process, but also the possibility of corruption and bribe-seeking within the 
system.  The shopkeeper who asked to be identified as Austin mentioned that of 
the 10,000 rupees he expected to pay, only four to five thousand accounted for 
the actual registration fees, while the remainder would pay for a legal assistant to 
assure that he was not cheated during the process. 
 In addition to the difficulty of the registration process, the ease with 
which penalties are avoided and the inaccessibility of government promised 
benefits make registering a business a very unappealing process.  Austin, who 
notes he has many contacts within the government, is the only shopkeeper who 
expressed confidence in his ability to obtain government benefits.  The 
combination of the sway his government friends have and the information they 
can give him regarding the process makes him confident that eventually he will 
receive the benefits the government promises.  He admits, however, that for the 
majority of people who do not know government officials, it is extremely 
difficult to obtain loans, government-sanctioned electricity and phone 
connections to the business location, or any of the other benefits the government 
promises.  Almost all shopkeepers agreed with Austin’s assessment, expressing 
that they had either tried to get benefits from the government and been rebuffed, 
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or had been so discouraged by the experiences of their friends and neighbors that 
they did not even try.  Further interviews showed that in addition to poorly 
dispersing incentives, the government is not effectively enforcing disincentives. 
 The unregistered shopkeepers to whom I spoke were almost universally 
not worried about the consequences of operating their businesses illegally.  
Though certainly this could be evidence of a self-selection problem in which 
those who were worried about the government opted out of talking to me, the 
shopkeepers’ experiences with government figures are nonetheless revealing.  
Most unregistered shopkeepers said that when government workers came around 
they simply told the officials that the shop was very new and they were planning 
to register as soon as they had time.  Because the registration process is so 
difficult it is nearly impossible to force shop owners through the steps of 
registration, and most government officials choose not to levy fines or penalties.  
Additionally, shopkeepers identified as John and Julie both relied heavily on 
imports for their unregistered businesses, even though importing without 
registration is illegal.  Though both conceded that importing would be a simpler 
process with registration, neither feared that they would be punished by the 
government, or believed that illegally importing their goods was particularly 
difficult.  Hector on the other hand, the owner of a legally registered clothing 
shop, felt frustrated that his imports were being heavily taxed while unregistered 
businesses so easily avoided these taxes.   
2.3) Confusion and Under-registration 
With the benefits of registration difficult to obtain, shopkeepers often 
have little motivation to figure out the complex steps towards properly 
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registering a business.  One of the most pressing problems with the registration 
process is that the lack of clarity and information availability make the process 
difficult to engage in, difficult to study, and difficult to fix.  In studying the 
informal economy Akash Shrestha, an employee of Samriddhi: The Prosperity 
Foundation, found that 37.4% of survey respondents believed Nepal’s 
registration process to be easy.  Although this seems reasonable, upon following 
up with this contingent it was found that the vast majority were improperly 
registered and still operating illegally.  To properly comply with all government 
regulations, a shop owner must register their business with their local governing 
body – a municipality office or Village Development Committee (VDC) – the 
Ministry of Commerce and Supplies, the central Ministry of Industry, and the 
Ministry of Finance (Akash Shrestha, 2014). 
 In a few cases, I did find shop owners who reported a very simple 
registration process taking only a few days, or who expected a simple process 
once they got around to registering.  A shopkeeper who asked to be identified 
only as Kamal reported that registering his business was very simple, took him 
only three days, and required him to visit only two different places (Kamal, 
2014).  John, who plans to register in approximately two months, predicts a 
process of 3-4 days (John, 2014).  Given the four ministries with which 
businesses are required to register, it is almost certain that John and Kamal are 
registering their shops incompletely.   
 This phenomenon of partial or incomplete registration makes it difficult 
to properly assess the degree to which the government is intentionally 
withholding benefits from small shop owners.  In an interview Mr. Shrestha 
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stated that many shopkeepers are not receiving the benefits they were promised 
because they are improperly registered (Akash Shrestha, 2014).  Thus, without 
conducting a thorough examination of a shopkeeper’s registration process and 
the way they went about claiming their benefits, it is impossible to understand 
whether benefits were legally or illegally denied to them.  With such a difficult 
process for both registering and claiming benefits, it is easy for government 
officials to deny wrongdoing, and very difficult to agitate for proper dispensation 
of benefits. 
 Mr. Krishna Man Shrestha heads the Kirana Pasal Byaapaar Sangh, an 
organization representing the interests of small food shops.  Mr. Shrestha 
believes that a “one window policy” – one in which shopkeepers need only to 
register in one ministry and this ministry shares the shopkeeper’s information 
with other government offices – is the most important step towards reform.  He 
says it is imperative for small shops to register with the government, but that the 
difficulty of registration discourages people who otherwise would be willing to 
register (Krishna Man Shrestha, 2014).  This policy would also ensure that no 
businesses are partially registered, thereby increasing the ease with which 
shopkeepers could claim benefits and government agencies who withheld 
benefits could be exposed. 
 In addition to being confused about the registration process, none of the 
shopkeepers I interviewed were aware of the specific incentives offered by the 
ILO’s campaign.  While many knew of the more longstanding government 
benefits such as being able to take out a loan, none knew that the ILO had 
partnered with Megabank to make taking out a loan easier, and few knew about 
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the business trainings offered by the ILO.  Komal Bhatta works for the 
Employment Fund, a program of the Swiss NGO Helvetas which works directly 
with the ILO, and yet even he knew nothing about the benefits from the new 
campaign. 
Mr. Bhatta runs a program for the Employment Fund which teaches 
marginalized youth vocational and business skills, ultimately culminating in each 
individual operating their own micro-enterprise.  The program employs phased 
incentives, in which participants receive monetary grants after achieving certain 
goals, such as completing training, operating a business, and remaining employed 
for a certain time period after the training ends. Because the program works with 
the Nepali government, graduates of the program are supposed to formally 
register their businesses before they receive a payout.  Mr. Bhatta, however, says 
that the program has changed the requirement for payout from registering a 
business to operating a business, because the registration process has been so 
frustrating for many micro-enterprise owners.  He believes that forcing program 
graduates to register does nothing but create animosity towards the government 
when people inevitably run into bureaucratic hurdles.  Instead, Mr. Bhatta says 
that allowing graduates to register when they are ready makes it more likely that 
they complete the process and maintain a positive attitude towards the 
government.  
Shailendra Kumar Jha of the ILO believes that poor information 
dissemination and lackluster collaboration among stakeholders are two of the 
most important problems to tackle in registering the informal economy.  He says 
that the ILO is currently conducting an informational campaign to reach 
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shopkeepers, and working to centralize registration activities at the District 
Cottage and Small Industry Office. Because the registration process is currently 
scattered among various government industries, it is difficult for initiatives which 
should be working together to coordinate.  Missed opportunities due to poor 
information are not uncommon.  He believes that with registration activities 
centralized in one place, government ministries, NGOs, and other stakeholders 
will be better able to collaborate (Kumar Jha, 2014).   
  Professor Ram Chandra Dhakal, head of Tribhuvan University’s Center 
for Economic Development and Administration (CEDA), believes that much of 
the distrust and confusion surrounding registration is the result of certain 
ministries prioritizing tax collection over other aspects of registration (Dhakal, 
2014).  To properly register a business the owner must first register with the 
District Cottage and Small Industry Office, after which they can register with the 
municipality office, tax office, and industry-specific office (Kumar Jha, 2014). 
However, certain ministries intentionally overlook incorrectly done registrations 
so long as their office is receiving taxes or fees.  Thus, shopkeepers sometimes 
end up incompletely registered and ineligible to collect government benefits even 
though they are paying taxes. 
2.4) Post-Registration Difficulties 
 Akash Shrestha warns that registering businesses too hastily could prove 
to be a problem for Nepal’s economy.  Given the largely inefficient bureaucracy, 
Mr. Shrestha worries that small shops, which are currently a strong source of 
income and employment for Nepali people, could suffer or even fail due to 
burdensome government regulations.  Mr. Shrestha, who conducted many 
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interviews with shopkeepers for his own research, has sometimes found that 
shopkeepers who were doing good business before registration feel harassed by 
the government after they register.  He tells a story of one man who began selling 
packages of rice, and saw his business grow.  Though most stores carrying rice 
weigh out the rice depending on how much people want, this shop owner found 
that one and two kilogram orders were the most popular, so he began pre-
packaging orders of this size.  As people found they could save time by quickly 
grabbing a package instead of waiting for their rice to be weighed, his shop 
began to grow, and so he registered.  After registration, the shop was visited by 
government officials who subjected the packages to harsh regulations, saying that 
packaged food needed to be inspected for cleanliness and needed to comply with 
a host of other requirements, even though the food he sold was in no way 
different from the unpackaged rice other stores offered.  Rather than attempt to 
navigate the bureaucracy surrounding compliance with these regulations, the 
shopkeeper went back to weighing rice on demand and stopped selling the 
packages that had been driving his shop’s growth (Akash Shrestha, 2014). 
 Many shopkeepers fear registration because it puts them on the 
government’s radar, or simply because they cannot afford the time it takes to 
register.  Kamala says that she feels unable to register because the difficult 
process would force her to close her shop for fifteen days, which she simply 
cannot afford to do.  Anju, who has registered her shop, now feels trapped by the 
government.  Every year she must re-register her shop, a process which, though 
simpler than the initial registration, she still finds difficult.  Before voluntarily 
registering she had never been forced to pay a fine, but now that she is officially 
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in the government’s books she faces steep penalties if she fails to re-register 
every year.  She says that the time she must take away from tending to her 
business to register every year is harmful.  Because many shopkeepers do not 
trust the government, or find the bureaucracy to be inefficient, they simply fear 
being monitored by the government.  Though most say that the taxes they would 
pay if registered are practically negligible, they fear that the government could 
change tax structure or regulations in the future.  Anju, frustrated by how 
registration has affected her shop, says that the benefit she wants most from the 
government is “laws like those in other countries
1
” (Anju, 2014). 
4) Relationships With the Government 
4.1) Negative Views and Mindset Changes 
 Though the literature surrounding registration focuses on the role of 
individual incentives, participants in my research generally disregarded 
individual benefits when considering registration, instead focusing on the 
government’s overall performance.  When asked why they chose to operate their 
shops illegally, almost all unregistered shopkeepers I interviewed responded that 
the government’s inability to provide good roads, water systems, and electricity 
made them feel as though the government did not have a right to tax and regulate 
them.  David, whose shop has been operating for over twenty years, describes the 
government as “the biggest thieves
2
” and does not plan to register.  Though when 
asked about benefits to his shop he replies that only big businesses are able to get 
                                                     
1 Quote translated from Nepali 
2 Quote translated from Nepali 
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benefits, he makes it clear that he is much more concerned about the larger 
infrastructural failures of Nepal’s government (David, 2014). 
 Not all have such drastic views as David, but even those participants who 
are not particularly angry at the government see its failures as a rational reason 
for avoiding taxes.  Jay, who said his business has been bad this year, plans to 
register when he sees sales picking up.  Until then, he feels that he has a right to 
remain unregistered given how poorly the government is responding to the needs 
of its citizens.  Although Jay eventually wants to operate his business legally, he 
feels that because the government uses his taxes so poorly, he has no 
responsibility to pay them until he sees positive developments in the government 
(Jay, 2014).  Kamala states simply that if the government improves, she will 
surely go register (Kamala, 2014).  Many participants in my research who 
registered despite negative views of the government said that they registered 
merely because it was compulsory.  These participants mostly reported having 
not given registration much thought, though some later regret having registered 
without having considered the costs and the benefits. 
 Some believe that justifying tax evasion based on poor government 
performance inevitably creates vicious cycles of low tax revenues, under-funded 
governments, poor infrastructure, and further tax evasion.  Komal Bhatta of the 
Employment Fund believes that a mindset change among shopkeepers is 
necessary to break this negative feedback loop.  Though Mr. Bhatta has 
repeatedly seen firsthand the frustrations of registration, he still feels that the 
Nepali people should feel a duty to register their businesses and pay their taxes.  
He believes that “responsible citizen” thinking is emerging in the Nepali people, 
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and when this kind of thinking becomes widespread it will help to break the 
vicious cycle of poor infrastructure, lack of faith in government, and tax evasion.  
Even so, Mr. Bhatta admits that the government has largely crafted policies 
which favor big enterprises over small shops, and that the government has a part 
to play in breaking this cycle (Bhatta, 2014). 
 Krishna Man Shrestha of the Kirana Byaapaari Sangh, however, believes 
that a mindset change can also be instrumental in combating policies which are 
unfavorable for small businesses.  Mr. Shrestha believes that ultimately 
registration will greatly improve the growth potential of Nepal’s micro-
enterprises.  Currently, Mr. Shrestha believes that a major problem with 
informality is the government’s lack of information concerning the economic 
activities that occur in the informal sector.  Without access to this information 
Mr. Shrestha believes the government is incapable of making policy which is 
conducive to economic growth and increased employment in small businesses.  
A tendency for government policy to favor large enterprises, which shopkeepers 
I interviewed largely believed to be a deliberate attempt to ignore them, may 
instead be the result of a lack of information.  Thus, Mr. Shrestha recommends a 
mindset change among shopkeepers in which they recognize the collective 
benefits of registration and provide the government the information it needs to 
make informed policies (Krishna Man Shrestha, 2014).  
While belief in a “mindset change” method of solving Nepal’s micro-
enterprise problems accurately identifies what the Nepali government needs, it 
cannot make predictions about what the government will do.  It is true that 
without an adequate tax base the Nepali government cannot fund infrastructural 
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projects, and that without collecting information on micro-enterprises the Nepali 
government cannot write informed policy.  This does not mean, however, that 
with adequate tax revenue and information the government would effectively fix 
Nepal’s infrastructural problems and rewrite policy to favor small businesses.  
The idea that mindset change is necessary places the entire burden of Nepal’s 
problems squarely on the shoulders of poor Nepali citizens, asking them to trust 
that the government will fulfill its role after they have fulfilled theirs.  
Shopkeepers such as David and Jay, who have not seen government promises 
fulfilled in the past, or tax dollars put to good use, prefer to wait for signs of 
improvement in the government before they change their mindset and register 
their businesses. 
 The performance of the current government, in fact, suggests that tax 
evasion may not be hurting the government as much as some claim.  The 
Himalayan Times reports that in the 2013 fiscal year the government was only 
able to spend about half of its budget (The Himalayan Times, 2013).  In 2014 
The Himalayan Times credits a poor planning process and ad hoc decision 
making as the government again fails to spend even half of its fiscal year budget 
(The Himalayan Times, 2014).  The government’s inability to spend its budget 
despite Nepal’s glaring infrastructure problems suggests that greater tax flows 
are unlikely to fix the problems that shopkeepers complain about.  Thus, it seems 
that tax evasion is not likely to be related to Nepal’s infrastructural failures.  
4.2) I Want to Pay Taxes 
 However much certain shopkeepers may distrust the government, the idea 
of mindset change is far from a pipe dream.  When asked what the primary 
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benefits of registration were, shopkeepers Kumar and Kamal both cited the 
ability to pay their taxes as one of the most important aspects of operating their 
businesses legally.  When I used a more specific question, asking what the 
government had directly done for their shops since registration, but Kumar and 
Kamal replied that the government does not provide benefits to small shops.  
And yet despite the fact that the government has done nothing for them directly, 
both shopkeepers feel happy to register their shops and pay their taxes. 
 The key to Kumar and Kamal’s willingness to operate their businesses 
legally seems to lie in how they perceive their current and future governments.  
Kamal has faith in the current Nepali government, saying that he feels his taxes 
go towards important development projects. Though Kumar does not express 
such optimism concerning the current Nepali government, he does believe that in 
the future the government will stabilize.  He says that he expects the government 
to begin fulfilling the promises it has made to small registered shops within a 
year of stabilization. 
5) Discussion/Analysis 
Dr. Ram Chandra Dhakal of Tribhuvan University identifies two keys to 
registering Nepal’s informal economy: improving the registration process and 
having the government follow through on its promises to shopkeepers (Dhakal, 
2014).  My research supports these views, showing that to the shopkeepers whom 
I interviewed the difficulties of registration and their level of trust in the 




My findings also strengthen a trend in the informal sector literature which 
indicates that political factors may be even more important than market factors in 
determining the size of a country’s informal economy.  Professor Dhakal agrees, 
stating that many used to believe Nepal’s economic growth would eradicate 
informal activities, but people have now begun to understand the importance of 
political factors.  Though certainly Professor Dhakal sees nothing wrong with the 
ILO’s campaign or NGO initiatives, he believes that such efforts play a minor 
part in addressing the problems of the informal economy compared to rectifying 
the larger issues of poor policy and political instability (Dhakal, 2014). 
Certainly the most important finding of this study is that the Nepali 
government has the most important role to play in encouraging registration of the 
informal economy, and yet these findings can also inform the actions of both 
government and non-government initiatives.  It is important to note that a lack of 
information sharing and communication accounts for many of the problems 
discussed in this paper.  The difficulty of the business registration process stems 
largely from the unwillingness of various ministries to share information and 
collaborate.  Similarly, NGOs miss many important opportunities when they fail 
to communicate with the government and one another.  By working with the 
Employment Fund, the ILO could be disseminating information about the 
incentives it offers for registration to many new small business owners, and yet 
even Mr. Bhatta who runs the skill and business training program knows nothing 
about the ILO’s campaign.  My findings suggest that individuals or NGOs 
working with the informal sector – or perhaps any sector – in Nepal should strive 
to combat the inefficiencies that arise when information sharing and 
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collaboration are not practiced.  Essentially, the process of registering the 
informal economy is one that will be defined by the government’s actions in the 
coming years as well as NGOs’ willingness to support the government as 
opposed to spearheading isolated initiatives. 
Another important implication of this research is that government 
agencies and NGOs working to register the informal sector should tread 
carefully; a short-term rise in the number of registered businesses does not 
necessarily indicate success.  Firstly, the initiatives must take into account 
whether businesses can survive the registration process and post-registration 
difficulties.  If businesses are unable to sustain themselves because of time taken 
off for registration, or crumble under new regulations and suffocating 
bureaucracy, then registration can hardly be called a success.  As De Soto argues 
in The Other Path and Akash Shrestha notes in the Nepali context, governments 
should create a business environment and bureaucracy conducive to growth, 
employment, and prosperity before they focus their efforts on eradicating 
informal enterprises (De Soto, 1989)(Shrestha, 2014).  The government should 
especially take into account that because they have not been collecting 
information about informal economic activities, their current policy may not be 
appropriate for regulating the kinds of businesses that are currently unregistered.  
As such, if the government expects such business to enter the formal economy, 
they must be alert for signs of inappropriate policies and be willing to adjust and 
rewrite accordingly. 
Secondly, all initiatives must consider that, in the long run, trust in the 
government appears to be of utmost importance for convincing businesses to 
Lindgren 29 
 
operate legally.  This means that any gains in registration caused by offering 
incentives is likely to be offset by future decreases in registration if the 
government does not follow through on its promises. Given the registration cost-
benefit analysis described by participants in my research, it seems that building 
strong relationships between shopkeepers and the government should be 
prioritized over any short-term strategy to increase registration.  The government, 
and any other agencies involved in registration, should ensure that they are able 
to follow through with any promises they make. 
While it is important for ministries and NGOs involved in registration to 
practice information sharing, collaboration, and flexible policy, we must keep in 
mind that political instability on a greater scale also contributes to Nepal’s large 
informal economy.  Lack of proper infrastructure and distrust of the government 
as a whole are problems which have profound implications for Nepal’s informal 
economy.  Despite any future improvements to registration made by the ILO, 
various ministries, or NGOs, it seems that many shopkeepers will continue to 
operate illegally until Nepal’s government stabilizes.   
Though the opinions of those who participated in my research can 
certainly help inform future decisions surrounding registration, my findings must 
be understood as what they are: a non-random collection of shopkeeper opinions 
rather than a representative sample, or a quantitative analysis of people’s beliefs.  
The shopkeepers I interviewed almost all had some social connection to me, were 
all willing to talk about their registration status, and were mostly concentrated 
within a similar geographic area.  In short, there is undoubtedly selection bias in 
the series of opinions expressed in these pages.  Additionally, there is no way of 
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ensuring that opinions expressed to me were truly felt by the interviewees, as 
opposed to being expressed in order to sound patriotic, or for fear of being found 
by the government.  Indeed, there is no way even to completely ensure that those 
who claimed to be registered indeed were. 
Despite these limitations, this research gives shopkeepers a platform to 
express what matters to them.  Future research should work to address these 
limitations, and either strengthen or challenge my conclusions so that good 
policy recommendations can be made.  If researchers can overcome the barrier of 
fear that exists when discussing illegal activities, a quantitatively rigorous survey 
analysis of shopkeepers’ registration statuses and opinions would provide more 
substantial evidence on which to inform the government’s actions.  Additionally, 
expanding the interviewee base to sectors beyond small retail shops would help 
to give a more balanced perspective on Nepal’s informal sector.  According to 
the ILO, tourist services, agricultural activities, and construction companies are 
among the other sectors in Nepal which are disproportionally informal.  Before 
writing policy that would affect all informal enterprises, more research must be 
done on how other sections of Nepal’s informal economy feel about the 
registration process.  Lastly, future research should investigate the effects of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies, distrust of government, and lack of information 
sharing on other initiatives in Nepal.  Clearly these three problems have posed 
numerous difficulties to Nepal’s informal sector and the government’s attempts 
to register it, and there is no reason to believe these same problems do not have 





 My research contributes to the largely macro-level discussion of informal 
economies by providing qualitative information directly from shopkeepers 
participating in the informal economy, NGOs studying and serving the informal 
economy, and government figures running initiatives which affect the informal 
economy.  Additionally, this study adds to the Nepali-specific informal economy 
literature which, given the many state-specific aspects of the informal economy, 
is critical for forming policy recommendations.  Based on the opinions of those I 
interviewed it seems that the persistence of Nepal’s informal sector is largely 
driven by a difficult and confusing registration process, poor information sharing 
and collaboration among various government ministries, as well as NGOs, and a 
general distrust of the government.   
 It seems that to productively integrate the informal economy into the 
formal, the government must focus on building trust among Nepali citizens, 
encouraging collaboration among ministries to centralize the registration process, 
and writing flexible policy concerning the informal economy.  NGOs involved 
with the informal economy should recognize that the government has the largest 
role to play in registering the informal economy, and thus should actively pursue 
collaboration with the government.  Though some believe that a mindset change 
among Nepali citizens is the first step towards breaking the vicious cycles 
described in this research, I find that shopkeepers often have good reason for 
being skeptical of the government.  It seems more likely that the government can 
break these cycles by building trust among shopkeepers than that Nepali citizens 
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